{"id":5246,"date":"2012-06-11T22:29:47","date_gmt":"2012-06-12T04:29:47","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/?p=5246"},"modified":"2012-06-21T11:19:42","modified_gmt":"2012-06-21T17:19:42","slug":"do-as-we-say-not-as-we-do","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/?p=5246","title":{"rendered":"Do as we say, not as we do"},"content":{"rendered":"

I couldn’t help but be reminded of the CyberSource v. Retail Decisions<\/span>, 654 F. 3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)\u00a0case today when I read the court’s opinion in\u00a0Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp.<\/span>, 2011-1204 (Fed. Cir. June 11, 2012).\u00a0 In Toshiba<\/span>, Judge Moore writing for the court\u00a0states:<\/p>\n

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“[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.<\/strong>“<\/span><\/span><\/div>\n

Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp.<\/span><\/span><\/em>, 566 F.3d 1075, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting <\/span>Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.<\/span><\/span><\/em>, 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). <\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

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One would assume\u00a0that principle\u00a0applies\u00a0to article of manufacture claims (like the Beauregard claim at issue in CyberSource)<\/span> as well.<\/p>\n

In another recent case, Smartmetric Inc. v. American Express Co.<\/span>,\u00a02011-1473, (Fed. Cir. April 11, 2012)\u00a0Judge Moore\u00a0noted that the Federal Circuit does not rewrite claims, but instead gives effect to the terms chosen by the patentee:<\/p>\n

Construing “insertion . . . into” to also mean “passed near” would deviate from the term’s plain and ordinary meaning, conflict with the specification, and erroneously rewrite the claims. See <\/em>K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A.,<\/em> 191 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999)<\/span><\/a> (“Courts do not rewrite claims; instead, we give effect to the terms chosen by the patentee<\/strong>.”).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In Chef America v. Lamb-Weston<\/span>, 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004), Judge Friedman writing for the court stated that a court may not redraft a claim even to sustain its validity:<\/p>\n

This court, however, repeatedly and consistently has recognized that courts may not redraft claims, whether to make them operable or to sustain their validity.<\/strong> <\/span>See, e.g.<\/span>, Allen Eng\u2019g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc.<\/span>, 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int\u2019l, Inc.<\/span>, 214 F.3d 1302, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Process Control Corp. v. Hydreclaim Corp.<\/span>, 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Rhine v. Casio, Inc.<\/span>, 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC<\/span>, 65 F.3d 1577, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.<\/span>, 922 F.2d 792, 799 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1990). <\/span>Even \u201ca nonsensical result does not require the court to redraft the claims of the [\u2019290] patent. <\/span>Rather, where as here, claims are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a whole, the claim must be invalidated.\u201d <\/span>Process Control Corp.<\/span>, 190 F.3d at 1357. <\/span>\u201cWhere, as here, the claim is susceptible to only one reasonable construction, the canons of claim construction cited by [Chef America] are inapposite, and we must construe the claims based on the patentee\u2019s version of the claim as he himself drafted it<\/strong>.\u201d <\/span>Id.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

And, of course there is the Supreme Court case White v. Dunbar,<\/em> 119 U.S. 47, 51-52, 7 S.Ct. 72, 74-75, 30 L.Ed. 303 (1886),<\/span><\/a>, where Justice Bradley wrote:<\/p>\n

Some persons seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax, which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include something more than, or something different from, what its words express…. The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.<\/strong> This has been so often expressed in the opinions of this court that it is unnecessary to pursue the subject further.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

With those citations in mind, it is\u00a0disheartening that the court stated the following in CyberSource<\/span>:<\/p>\n

CyberSource argues that claim 2 is patent-eligible per se because it recites a “manufacture,” rather than a “process,” under the statutory language of \u00a7 101. CyberSource contends that, by definition, a tangible, man-made article of manufacture such as a “computer readable medium containing program instructions” cannot possibly fall within any of the three patent-eligibility exceptions the Supreme Court has recognized for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, [or] abstract ideas.” Appellant’s Br. 47-48 (quoting Bilski,<\/em> 130 S.Ct. at 3225<\/span><\/a>). We disagree.<\/p>\n

Regardless of what statutory category (“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,” 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 101) a claim’s language is crafted to literally invoke, we look to the underlying invention for patent-eligibility purposes.<\/strong> Here, it is clear that the invention underlying both claims 2 and 3 is a method for detecting credit card fraud, not a manufacture for storing computer-readable information. This case is thus similar to In re Abele,<\/em> 684 F.2d 902 (CCPA 1982)<\/span><\/a>. In Abele,<\/em> claim 5 of the patent at issue recited “[a] method of displaying data” comprising the steps of “calculating the difference” between two numbers and “displaying the value.” Id.<\/em> at 908. The court concluded that claim 5 was not directed to patent-eligible subject matter because it claimed an abstract idea. Id.<\/em> However, claim 7 was argued to be different because it recited an “[a]pparatus<\/em> for displaying data” comprising “means<\/em> for calculating the differences” between two numbers and “means<\/em> for displaying the value.” Id.<\/em> at 909 (emphases added). Though claim 7 literally invoked an “[a]pparatus,” the court treated it as a method claim for the purpose of its \u00a7 101 analysis. Due to its “broad” and “functionally-defined” nature, the court found that treating claim 7 as an apparatus claim would “exalt form over substance since the claim is really to the method or series of functions itself.” Id.<\/em> (citation omitted). Accordingly, the court placed “the burden… on the applicant to demonstrate that the claims [were] truly drawn to [a] specific apparatus distinct from other apparatus[es] capable of performing the identical functions.” Id.<\/em> (citation omitted).<\/p>\n

In the present case, CyberSource has not met its burden to demonstrate that 1375<\/a>*1375<\/span><\/a> claim 2 is “truly drawn to a specific” computer readable medium, rather than to the underlying method of credit card fraud detection. To be sure, after Abele,<\/em> we have held that, as a general matter, programming a general purpose computer to perform an algorithm “creates a new machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.” In re Alappat,<\/em> 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed.Cir. 1994)<\/span><\/a>. But we have never suggested that simply reciting the use of a computer to execute an algorithm that can be performed entirely in the human mind falls within the Alappat<\/em> rule. Thus, despite its Beauregard claim format, under Abele,<\/em> we treat claim 2 as a process claim for patent-eligibility purposes.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I couldn’t help but be reminded of the CyberSource v. Retail Decisions, 654 F. 3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)\u00a0case today when I read the court’s opinion in\u00a0Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp., 2011-1204 (Fed. Cir. June 11, 2012).\u00a0 In Toshiba, Judge Moore writing for the court\u00a0states: “[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5246"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5246"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5246\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5256,"href":"https:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5246\/revisions\/5256"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5246"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5246"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.717madisonplace.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5246"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}