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The Supreme Court held oral argument today in SEC v. Jarkesy. The importance of the case and the potential impact on administrative law is perhaps reflected by the fact that the Court devoted an unusually long 2 hours and 17 minutes to oral argument.

You can listen to the oral argument here: [Link].

The transcript is available here: [Link].

The Supreme Court is midway through its briefing in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy. Readers might find some of the briefing interesting for the references to the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Arthrex. [Link to briefs].

Oral argument date to be determined.

The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument in Best Carpet Values, Inc. v. Google, LLC, yesterday. The plaintiffs below asserted trespass to chattels (among other things) based on alteration of a website display.

The district court framed trespass to chattels as follows:

Trespass to chattels lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property has caused injury. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1350-51 (2003); see also Brodsky v. Apple Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148808, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2019). “Dubbed by Prosser the `little brother of conversion,’ the tort of trespass to chattels allows recovery for interferences with possession of personal property `not sufficiently important to be classed as conversion, and so to compel the defendant to pay the full value of the thing with which he has interfered.'” Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1350(quoting Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 14, pp. 85-86). Under California law, “[i]n cases of interference with possession of personal property not amounting to conversion, `the owner has a cause of action for trespass or case [sic], and may recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the property or the loss of its use.'” In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2012)(quoting Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1351).

BEST CARPET VALUES, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC, No. 5: 20-cv-04700-EJD (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2021) [Link].

You can watch yesterday’s oral argument at the Ninth Circuit here:

Today’s quiz asks what area of legal precedents was this quote describing:

“a farrago of fumblings which have suffered too long from a surfeit of deficient theories.“

A: Takings law

B: Patent eligibility law

C: Patent eligibility law

D: Patent eligibility law

There were some fun audio bites in the oral argument of CR BARD, INC. v. Medical Components, Inc., No. 2022-1136 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 17, 2023).

Judge Hughes had some frank comments about the court injecting printed matter into patent eligibility determinations:

You can listen to the entire oral argument here:

I saw a blurb yesterday in IPLaw360 that highlighted an appeal from a Fifth Circuit case that will be heard by the Supreme Court next term. The case is Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F.4th 446 (5th Cir. 2022).

Some of the issues raised in the oral argument at the Fifth Circuit are somewhat related to those that were raised in the Arthrex and Oil States decisions. The Oil States decision is also discussed in the briefing to the Supreme Court, as well as in the dissenting opinion at the Fifth Circuit.

You can listen to the Fifth Circuit oral argument here:

The issues presented in the appeal to the Supreme Court are:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether statutory provisions that empower the
   Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate
   and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings
   seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment.
2. Whether statutory provisions that authorize the
   SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an
   agency adjudication instead of filing a district court ac-
   tion violate the nondelegation doctrine.
3. Whether Congress violated Article II by granting
   for-cause removal protection to administrative law
   judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal
   protection.

The oral argument of the day is from LKQ CORPORATION v. GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS LLC, No. 2021-2348 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2023). The Federal Circuit recently granted en banc review in this case.

I am listing a second oral argument, as well, as there was a companion case argued immediately following the 2021-2348 oral argument. I thought some people might find it interesting.

When argued, the en banc argument should feature Judge Clevenger. While he is a senior judge, he was part of the original panel. So, he is entitled to participate in the en banc decision with the full-time members of the court — although, I believe the Federal Circuit changed its procedures in recent years so that senior judges on the original panel are no longer allowed to vote in determining whether to take a case en banc. Judge Clevenger authored the “Durling” decision in 1996. In the original 2021-2348 panel decision, the “Rosen” and “Durling” tests are discussed.

We all have probably encountered an obviousness argument that cobbled together references in an unconvincing manner. In this earlier post, such a combination was aptly described as a Frankenstein combination.

I was trying to think of some other phrases that the Federal Circuit could use in future opinions to describe such combinations of features/elements/limitations/references. Here are a few suggestions:

a chaotic bricolage

an omnium gatherum

a wishful patchwork

a cacophonous medley

an unpalatable goulash

a conglomeration abomination

an unfettered quilt

a motley melange

a concocted Chimera

a chimeric concoction

a synthetic snarl

an incongruous union

a monster mishmash

That society should protect, and thereby stimulate, investment in innovation—not just invention—has been held by many; but few were as consistent in their conclusions as Joseph A. Schumpeter, who on these grounds favored permitting monopolistic practices of various sorts. He argued that temporary security from competition, through cartels, patents, or other restraints, would encourage firms to put more venture capital into innovating investment. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942), pp. 81-106.

“An Economic Review of the Patent System,” Fritz Machlup, United States Government Printing Office 1958, page 9, footnote 44.

The Supreme Court has granted cert. in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The issue in that case is:

Whether the court should overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

An interesting article would be one that considers how overruling of Chevron would impact patent law. Would the current make-up of the Federal Circuit be a better or worse choice in deciding historically Chevron issues, as opposed to deference to administrative officials at the USPTO?

This quiz question concerns a situation where one of the three judges of a Federal Circuit panel dissents from the two judge majority opinion. Which of these answers is/are correct for designating the opinion precedential:

• a). both judges in the majority vote to make the opinion precedential;
• b). one judge in the majority votes to make the opinion precedential and the other two judges vote against it;
• c). one judge in the majority votes to make the opinion precedential and the dissenting judge votes to make the opinion precedential;
• d). neither judge in the majority votes to make the opinion precedential, but the dissenting judge votes to make the opinion precedential;
• e). all of the judges in the panel vote to make the opinion precedential;
• f). the Chief Judge can designate the opinion precedential, regardless of whether she is on the panel.
• Answer(s) below the break:

Judges Taranto and Newman pressed an issue during a recent oral argument as to who is the real party in interest when a membership organization brings an IPR. The importance in deciding the issue is that it affects how estoppel applies during future district court litigation (at least) for that patent. Should the estoppel apply just to the membership entity itself or should it also apply to the members of the membership entity? Should it apply to only the members who fund the IPR?

From Judge Newman’s and Judge Taranto’s comments, apparently this is an issue that is percolating now in the courts. So, look for more to come from the courts on this issue.

The oral argument was in the recently decided Rule 36 Judgment in VILOX TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC, No. 2019-2057 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 2023). [Opinion]. The court ultimately didn’t reach the issue in this case because the patent at issue was affirmed as invalid — thus it won’t be asserted in future litigation and estoppel won’t be an issue.

The entire oral argument is available for download here: [Link]. However, the pertinent discussion concerning who is the real party in interest when a membership organization brings an IPR is available here:

I was down in Argentina earlier this month and had the opportunity to do some fishing for a fish known as the Golden Dorado (a.k.a., ‘El Tigre del Rio’). While I was a patent attorney literally on a fishing expedition, it was not the same type that the Federal Circuit was referring to in Monarch Assur. PLC v. US, 244 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001):

Having said that, we wish to make clear to plaintiffs and their counsel that the trial court is not expected to, nor should it, simply allow plaintiffs to embark on a wide-ranging fishing expedition in hopes that there may be gold out there somewhere, or worse, in hopes that the Government will get tired of litigating and settle an otherwise unprovable case.

Monarch Assur. PLC v. US, 244 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).