Wheaton et al. v. Peters et al., 33 U.S. 591 (1834)

June 9th, 2016

A few years ago, I started a regular feature of posting the text of Supreme Court decisions that involved patents in some way.  The idea was to start with the earliest Supreme Court decisions and work toward present day.  Somehow that feature went off the rails.  So, let’s pick up again in 1834 with Wheaton et al. v. Peters et al., 33 U.S. 591 (1834), a copyright case that discusses the relationship between patents and copyrights:

HENRY WHEATON AND ROBERT DONALDSON, APPELLANTS
v.
RICHARD PETERS AND JOHN GRIGG.

Supreme Court of United States.

595*595 The case was argued by Mr Paine and Mr Webster, for the appellants; and by Mr Ingersoll, by a printed argument, and Mr Sergeant, for the defendants.

654*654 Mr Justice M’LEAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

After stating the case, he proceeded:

Some of the questions which arise in this case are as novel, in this country, as they are interesting. But one case involving similar principles, except a decision by a state court, has occurred; and that was decided by the circuit court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania, from whose decree no appeal was taken.

The right of the complainants must be first examined. If this right shall be sustained as set forth in the bill, and the defendants shall be proved to have violated it, the court will be bound to give the appropriate redress.

The complainants assert their right on two grounds.

First, under the common law.

Secondly, under the acts of congress.

And they insist, in the first place, that an author was entitled, at common law, to a perpetual property in the copy of his works, and in the profits of their publication; and to recover damages for its injury, by an action on the case, and to the protection of a court of equity.

In support of this proposition, the counsel for the complainants have indulged in a wide range of argument, and have shown great industry and ability. The limited time allowed for the preparation of this opinion, will not admit of an equally extended consideration of the subject by the court.

Perhaps no topic in England has excited more discussion, among literary and talented men, than that of the literary property of authors. So engrossing was the subject, for a long time, as to leave few neutrals, among those who were distinguished 655*655 for their learning and ability. At length the question, whether the copy of a book or literary composition belongs to the author at common law, was brought before the court of king’s bench, in the great case of Miller v. Taylor, reported in 4 Burr. 2303. This was a case of great expectation; and the four judges, in giving their opinions, seriatim, exhausted the argument on both sides. Two of the judges, and Lord Mansfield held, that, by the common law, an author had a literary property in his works; and they sustained their opinion with very great ability. Mr Justice Yeates, in an opinion of great length, and with an ability, if equalled, certainly not surpassed, maintained the opposite ground.

Previous to this case, injunctions had issued out of chancery to prevent the publication of certain works, at the instance of those who claimed a property in the copyright, but no decision had been given. And a case had been commenced, at law, between Tonson and Collins, on the same ground, and was argued with great ability, more than once, and the court of king’s bench were about to take the opinion of all the judges, when they discovered that the suit had been brought by collusion, to try the question, and it was dismissed.

This question was brought before the house of lords, in the case of Donaldson v. Beckett and others, reported in 4 Burr. 2408.

Lord Mansfield, being a peer, through feelings of delicacy, declined giving any opinion. The eleven judges gave their opinions on the following points. 1st. Whether at common law an author of any book or literary composition, had the sole right of first printing, and publishing the same for sale; and might bring an action against any person who printed, published and sold the same, without his consent. On this question there were eight judges in the affirmative, and three in the negative.

2d. If the author had such right originally, did the law take it away, upon his printing and publishing such book or literary composition; and might any person, afterward, reprint and sell, for his own benefit, such book or literary composition, against the will of the author. This question was answered in the affirmative, by four judges, and in the negative by seven.

3d. If such action would have lain, at common law, is it taken away by the statute of 8 Anne; and is an author, by 656*656 the said statute, precluded from every remedy, except on the foundation of the said statute, and on the terms of the conditions prescribed thereby. Six of the judges, to five, decided that the remedy must be under the statute.

4th. Whether the author of any literary composition, and his assigns, had the sole right of printing and publishing the same in perpetuity, by the common law. Which question was decided in favor of the author, by seven judges to four.

5th. Whether this right is any way impeached, restrained or taken away, by the statute 8 Anne? Six, to five judges, decided that the right is taken away by the statute. And the lord chancellor, seconding Lord Camden’s motion to reverse, the decree was reversed.

It would appear from the points decided, that a majority of the judges were in favor of the common law right of authors, but that the same had been taken away by the statute.

The title and preamble of the statute, 8 Anne, ch. 19, is as follows: “An act for the encouragement of learning by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.

“Whereas printers, booksellers and other persons, have of late frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting and publishing, or causing to be printed, reprinted and published, books and other writings without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings, to their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their families,” &c.

In 7 Term Rep. 627, Lord Kenyon says, “all arguments in the support of the rights of learned men in their works, must ever be heard with great favor by men of liberal minds to whom they are addressed. It was probably on that account that when the great question of literary property was discussed, some judges of enlightened understanding went the length of maintaining, that the right of publication rested exclusively in the authors and those who claimed under them for all time; but the other opinion finally prevailed, which established that the right was confined to the times limited by the act of parliament. And, that, I have no doubt, was the right decision.”

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The Judges of the Federal Circuit

May 25th, 2016
Front (L to R) Judges Clevenger, Plager, Newman, Prost, Mayer, Lourie, and Schall.  Back (L to R) Judges Hughes, Taranto, Reyna, Moore, Linn, Bryson, Dyk, O'Malley, Wallach, Chen and Stoll.  Click on image for a larger view.

Front (L to R) Judges Clevenger, Plager, Newman, Prost, Mayer, Lourie, and Schall. Back (L to R) Judges Hughes, Taranto, Reyna, Moore, Linn, Bryson, Dyk, O'Malley, Wallach, Chen, and Stoll. (Click on image for a larger view).

The judges are seated according to seniority/tenure on the court. For example, Chief Judge Prost is seated in the middle of the front row, as the most senior. To her right is Judge Newman who has the longest tenure on the court. To Chief Judge Prost’s left is Judge Mayer, who has the second longest tenure on the court after Judge Newman. The seating continues to alternate about Chief Judge Prost by tenure. In the back row, the arrangement by tenure continues and is centered about Judge Bryson. The court’s two newest appointees, Judges Hughes and Stoll, bookend the back row.

Panel Shopping?

May 24th, 2016

One would think that it would be impossible to panel shop at the Federal Circuit; but, I wonder if clever litigants have done so to a limited extent.  For example, I noticed that Judge Dyk frequently sits by designation with the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit during the last week of July/first week of August.  Presumably, he does not sit with the Federal Circuit in August during those years.  Therefore, I wonder if an appellant has ever cared enough about not having Judge Dyk on the panel that it calculated the average time for briefing etc. and strategically filed the notice of appeal on a date that would most likely have the Federal Circuit hear the argument in August?  I suppose that there’s a pattern as to when senior judges hear oral arguments, as well.  For example, a litigant with a 101 issue might not want — let’s just pick a random judge, Judge Mayer — to hear its case. I wonder if such a litigant has ever looked at the history of appearances and strategized accordingly.  Of course, such litigants would have been significantly limited by the narrow window that one has to file a notice of appeal after a decision by a lower tribunal.

The Federal Circuit can easily counter such tactics by being random with its scheduling.

Oral Argument of Enfish v. Microsoft

May 13th, 2016

If you are interested in listening to the oral argument from this week’s important decision in Enfish v. Microsoft, the oral argument recording is available [here].

The decision is available [here].

An audio key to each judge’s voice is available [here].

Rule 36 Opinions Still Being Relied Upon

May 6th, 2016

It is interesting that in the May 2016 Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, the USPTO continues to rely upon Rule 36 opinions as being instructive.  The Federal Circuit does not always address all issues on appeal to reach an affirmance of the Board.  For example, in In re Gleave the court stated:

Therefore, we affirm the Board’s rejection of claims 1, 4, 15, and 18-21 of the ‘493 application under § 102(b). We need not reach the § 103 obviousness rejection.

In re Gleave, 560 F. 3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

To the extent that an appeal resolved by a Rule 36 opinion contained more than a §101 rejection, how can the USPTO be certain that the Federal Circuit was affirming the rationale of the §101 rejection rather than just a §103 rejection, for example?

Moreover, I’m reminded of Judge Moore’s comment in  the oral argument of In re Collins, App. No. 2011-1293 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Judges Moore and Reyna took the PTO to task for a sloppy rejection of a claim.   An exasperated Judge Moore would remark “I think this is a terrible rejection.  I think you all [USPTO] have done a really sloppy job.  . . . This is ridiculous.  This is a bad rejection.  There’s a good rejection you could have made.  This isn’t it.“   [Listen] and [Listen].  The Board was affirmed by a Rule 36 opinion in that case.

Finallly, do a search of the MPEP.  See if you can find any place in the MPEP where the USPTO relies upon Rule 36 opinions of the Federal Circuit.

May 2016 Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance Update

May 4th, 2016

If you’re about to submit a response to a §101 rejection, please note that the May 2016 Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance Update was announced today.  Here is the link to the updated materials on the United States Patent and Trademark Office web site:  [link].

National Patent Prosecution Day . . . .

April 26th, 2016

I suppose that if there were ever to be a National Patent Prosecution Day, it would have to be celebrated on May 2nd.  After all, that is the anniversary of the Topliff v. Topliff decision in which the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged:

The specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the invention be at all complicated, constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy, and in view of the fact that valuable inventions are often placed in the hands of inexperienced persons to prepare such specifications and claims, it is no matter of surprise that the latter frequently fail to describe with requisite certainty the exact invention of the patentee, and err either in claiming that which the patentee had not in fact invented, or in omitting some element which was a valuable or essential part of his actual invention.

Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892).

I suppose another candidate would be June 16th. That is the anniversary of Diamond v. Chakrabarty:

The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.” S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952).

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 65 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1980).

Odds and Ends

April 6th, 2016

Just a few odds and ends:

1)  Patently-O’s birthday is today. Can you guess how many years?  Happy Birthday, Patently-O!

2)  Those filing patent cases in Delaware in hopes of having noted patent jurist Judge Sue Robinson hear their case might want to take note that Judge Robinson is slated to take senior status next February. [source]  Congratulations, Judge Robinson.  Judge Robinson sat by designation with the Federal Circuit back in 2007.

3)  Temple Grandin received her own kids’ playing card from the USPTO over the weekend.   [Source].  Congratulations, Dr. Grandin.

Magic Microscope Anniversary

April 4th, 2016

The Department of Justice stepped in to argue the AMP v. Myriad case five years ago today. It was during that argument at the Federal Circuit that the patent world got to hear about the DOJ’s “Magic Microscope” test.  One year later, the case would make its way to the Supreme Court, where the PTO did not join in briefing the case.  That contrasts with Cuozzo v. Lee, currently pending at the Supreme Court, in which both the PTO and the SG’s Office are briefing the case together.

© Johnson and Vobach 2016

Judge Moore noted the Magic Microscope test in her concurring opinion in the case:

Although the Patent Office has consistently followed the same policy for a decade (and arguably a century or more), the United States, as an amicus represented at argument by the Solicitor General, now argues that the Patent Office’s published guidelines are incorrect and a misstatement of the law. In place of these guidelines, the Solicitor General suggested that we should use a “magic microscope” as part of our section 101 analysis. If we could observe the claimed substance in nature using this microscope, the Solicitor General argues, it is not patentable. The magic microscope test applies equally to portions of a larger, naturally occurring molecule. For example, the optical field of view could be zoomed to see just a sequence of fifteen nucleotides within the chromosome. As long as you could “see” the claimed molecule in nature using the magic microscope, it would fall into the “laws of nature” exception and be unpatentable subject matter.

Certainly the magic microscope has curb appeal—its child-like simplicity an apparent virtue. The magic microscope, however, would not see the claimed DNA molecules at issue in this case. An isolated DNA molecule has different chemical bonds as compared to the “unisolated” sequence in the chromosome (the ends are different). In short, the claimed molecules cannot be seen in nature through the magic microscope. While you may be able to see the order of DNA nucleotides in the chromosome, the isolated fragment of 1369*1369 DNA is a different molecule. It may be that the microscope can also break and form chemical bonds to yield the claimed isolated DNA. Even so, the microscope must make some decisions: should the isolated DNA begin and end in a phosphate? a hydrogen? a hydroxyl? a methyl group? an acyl group? These decisions might be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, but they are not inherent to the unisolated sequence as part of the chromosome. Creating the claimed isolated DNA sequences therefore results in a distinctly unnatural molecule. Even the dissent agrees that the isolated DNA molecules at issue require cleaving chemical bonds, though it disputes the importance of the resulting distinct “`molecular species.'” Dissent at 1375 (quoting Linus Pauling, The Nature of the Chemical Bond 6 (3d ed.1960)). The magic microscope test simply does not work the way the government claims.

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2011)(Judge Moore concurring).

Justice Thomas announcing the Alice v. CLS decision

March 31st, 2016

I don’t believe that I ever posted Justice Thomas making the announcement of the Alice v. CLS decision.   You can listen to that announcement [here].

Nominate an inventor for the National Medal of Technology and Innovation

March 30th, 2016

The deadline is quickly approaching for nominating inventors for the National Medal of Technology and Innovation. If you are without a nominee and disillusioned by the Supreme Court’s patent eligibility test, I would have suggested that you consider nominating the inventors from the patent that was deemed patent ineligible in Ariosa v. Sequenom, 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) — that’s Patent No. 6,258,540. However, I suspect that those inventors are British.

From the USPTO website:

Nominations Sought for National Medal of Technology and Innovation

The Department of Commerce’s United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is seeking nominations for the 2016 National Medal of Technology and Innovation.
January 13, 2016
Press Release 16-01

CONTACT: (Media Only)
Paul Fucito or Sarah Maxwell
(571) 272-8400 or paul.fucito@uspto.gov(link sends e-mail) or sarah.maxwell@uspto.gov(link sends e-mail)

Washington – The Department of Commerce’s United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is seeking nominations for the 2016 National Medal of Technology and Innovation. The medal is presented each year by the President of the United States and is this country’s highest award for technological achievement.

The medal is awarded annually to individuals, teams (up to four individuals), companies or divisions of companies for their outstanding contributions to America’s economic, environmental and social well-being. By highlighting the national importance of technological innovation, the medal also seeks to inspire future generations of Americans to prepare for and pursue technical careers to keep America at the forefront of global technology and economic leadership.

The USPTO administers the medal program on behalf of the Secretary of Commerce. Detailed information about the requirements for submission of a nomination as well as a nomination form can be downloaded at NMTI Nominations. All completed nominations must be submitted to the USPTO by midnight (ET), April 1, 2016.

For more information about the process, please contact: nmti@uspto.gov(link sends e-mail).

Updated Federal Circuit Rules of Practice

March 30th, 2016

From the Federal Circuit web site (last accessed 3/30/2016):

2016-03-29 21:39

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has amended the Federal Circuit Rules of Practice. The new rules are available here including a summary of changes. The amendments are extensive and include incorporating the terms of the Administrative Order Regarding Electronic Case Filing dated May 17, 2012; revising the requirements for confidential markings; as well as other updates, conforming changes and editorial corrections throughout. The revised rules are effective and shall apply to all appeals docketed on or after Friday, April 1, 2016. The notice version of the Rules of Practice 2016 will soon be replaced by a new web-structure version with enhanced electronic functionality.

Washington and Lee to serve as “continuity of operations” site for CAFC

March 24th, 2016

 The Federal Circuit visited Washington and Lee University yesterday to hear oral arguments.  Washington and Lee has been named as the “continuity of operations”* site for the Federal Circuit in the event of an emergency.

The Federal Circuit will now sit at Washington and Lee once each year.  [Source]

*Continuity of Operations, as defined in the National Security Presidential Directive-51/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-20 (NSPD-51/HSPD-20) and the National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan (NCPIP), is an effort within individual executive departments and agencies to ensure that Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs) continue to be performed during a wide range of emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents and technological or attack-related emergencies.

“Redundant” is the new “Abstract”

March 23rd, 2016

There was a great quote in the dissent by Judge Reyna in the Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc. decision published today.

Judge Reyna quotes the Burlington Truck Lines case from the Supreme Court:

“Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process, but unless we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster which rules with no practical limits on its discretion.” Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Your natural inclination might be to think that Judge Reyna was referring to the PTO’s unbridled enthusiasm for declaring claims “abstract” without the citation of any evidence to substantiate such an assertion.  In this case, however, the issue was the redundancy doctrine and how it is applied in inter partes reviews.  Apparently, “redundant” is the new “abstract.”

You can read the opinion here: [Link].

Overuse of “printed matter” doctrine

March 19th, 2016

The associate solicitor for the USPTO ran into a buzz saw in the form of Judges Taranto and Hughes in the oral argument of In re Distefano.  The USPTO was fortunate as Chief Judge Prost opted to write the opinion for the court in this case.  She was the least vocal during the oral argument in criticizing the PTO and the opinion was somewhat tame compared to the oral argument.

As one example of the criticism, Judge Hughes remarked during the oral argument:

I mean you’re really asking us to let you be lazy. I don’t mean to be mean about it, but this is the third printed matter case I’ve seen from you all and I’ve only been here two years. And, they’ve all involved instances like this where the Board is trying to fix a sloppy examiner’s rejection.

You can listen to that comment here: [Listen].

You can listen to the entire oral argument here: [Listen].

You can read the opinion here [Read].