More Hybrid Claims Invalidated

February 23rd, 2011

The Federal Circuit expanded on its hybrid claim jurisprudence with its recent decision in In re Katz et al. v. American Airlines, et al., 2009-1450 et al., (Fed. Cir. February 18, 2011).  The court ruled that three of Katz’s claims — claims 1, 2, and 83 — were indefinite hybrid claims.  Those claims are shown below, but the relevant portion is in the independent claims 1 and 68:

1. An interface control system for use with, (1) a communication facility including remote terminals for individual callers to make calls, wherein said remote terminals comprise a telephone capability including voice communication means and some of said remote terminals comprise digital input means for providing data, (2) a multiple port, multiple format processor for concurrently processing data from a substantial number of callers in any one of a plurality of formats, said communication facility automatically providing call data signals, as to indicate called data (DNIS), to select a specific format from said plurality of formats, and (3) a plurality of live operator attended terminals, for a plurality of formats, said interface control system comprising:

call data means for receiving call data signals from said communication facility for a calling remote terminal indicative of calling number identification signals automatically provided by said communication facility and call data signals to indicate called data (DNIS) to select a specific format from said plurality of formats;

interface means for providing automated voice messages relating to said specific format to certain of said individual callers, wherein said certain of said individual callers digitally enter data, including at least caller information data, through said digital input means;

means for directly forwarding, under control of said specific format, a call coupled to said interface means from any one of said remote terminals to one of said plurality of live operator attended terminals for inputting of caller identification data and caller information data when said remote terminals do not have capability to digitally provide data; 

qualification means coupled to said live operator attended terminals for controlling access by at least certain of said callers to at least a portion of said system, said qualification being based at least in part on caller identification data entered through said digital input means by at least certain of said callers having digital input means and at said live operator attended terminal when said remote terminals do not have capability to digitally provide data,

means for processing coupled to said live operator attended terminals for processing caller information data entered by an operator at said live operator attended terminal; and

means for storing coupled to said interface means and said processing means for storing certain select data from said caller information data entered by said operator and data entered digitally by said individual callers to update records on said individual callers.

2. An interface control system according to claim 1, wherein said call data signals automatically provided from said communication facility for a calling remote terminal indicative of calling number identification signals are used to access a positive file of data with respect to said individual callers stored in said means for storing.

68. An interface control system for use with, (1) a communication facility including remote terminals for individual callers to make calls, wherein said remote terminals comprise a telephonic instrument including voice communication means and some of said remote terminals comprise digital input means for providing data, and (2) a multiple port, multiple format processor for concurrently processing data from a substantial number of callers in any of a plurality of formats, said communication facility automatically providing call data signals, as to indicate called data (DNIS), to select a particular format from said plurality of formats, and (3) a plurality of live operator attended terminals, for a plurality of formats, said interface control system comprising:

call data means for receiving signal-represented call data from said remote terminals indicative of called number identification signals (DNIS) automatically provided by said telephonic communication facility;

interface means for providing automated voice messages relating to a specific format to certain of said individual callers, wherein said certain of said individual callers digitally enter data through said digital input means;

means for directly forwarding certain of said calls coupled to said interface means from any one of said remote terminals to one of said plurality of live operator attended terminals under control of said call data signals when necessary;

qualification means for controlling access by at least certain of said callers to at least a portion of said system,

means for processing coupled to said live operator attended terminals for processing caller information data entered by an operator at said live operator attended terminal; and

means for transferring certain of said calls from said live operators to said interface means to receive processed data via a voice generator.

83. An interface control system according to claim 68, wherein said qualification means controls access at least in part based upon said call data signals.

The Federal Circuit had the following to say about these hybrid claims:

The district court held that Statistical Interface claims 1, 2, and 83 of the ’893 patent are indefinite under IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005), because they claim both an apparatus and a method of use. In IPXL, this court addressed a claim that covered a system with “an input means” and required a user to use the input means. This court held that the claim was indefinite because it was unclear “whether infringement . . . occurs when one creates a system that allows the user [to use the input means], or whether infringement occurs when the user actually uses the input means.” Id.

 

Claims 1, 2, and 83 of the ’893 patent cover a system with an “interface means for providing automated voice messages . . . to certain of said individual callers, wherein said certain of said individual callers digitally enter data.” The district court found “no meaningful distinction” between those claims and the claim at issue in IPXL.

 

Katz seeks to distinguish IPXL on the ground that the term “wherein” does not signify a method step but instead defines a functional capability. We disagree and uphold the district court’s ruling. Like the language used in the claim at issue in IPXL (“wherein . . . the user uses”), the language used in Katz’s claims (“wherein . . . callers digitally enter data” and “wherein . . . callers provide . . . data”) is directed to user actions, not system capabilities.

 

In the alternative, Katz contends that this court nar-rowed IPXL in the subsequent decision in Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2008). That case dealt with a method claim that recited structural elements. The claim took the form of a “method of executing instructions in a pipelined processor comprising: [structural limitations of the pipelined processor]; the method further comprising: [method steps implemented in the pipelined processor].” Id. at 1374. The court in Microprocessor distinguished IPXL because the method claim in Microprocessor did not create any confusion as to when the claim was directly infringed; direct infringement occurred upon practicing the claimed method in a processor with the required structural limitations. Simply making or selling a proces-sor having that structure would not have infringed. Katz’s claims, however, create confusion as to when direct infringement occurs because they are directed both to systems and to actions performed by “individual callers.” Katz’s claims therefore fall squarely within the rationale of IPXL and are indefinite.

As a point of reference, the relevant portion of the IPXL v. Amazon decision discussing hybrid claims reads as follows:

The district court found that claim 25 is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, as it attempts to claim both a system and a method for using that system. Section 112, paragraph 2, requires that the claims of a patent “particularly point[] out and distinctly

claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). A claim is considered indefinite if it does not reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of its scope. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

 

Whether a single claim covering both an apparatus and a method of use of that apparatus is invalid is an issue of first impression in this court. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) of the PTO, however, has made it clear that reciting both an apparatus and a method of using that apparatus renders a claim indefinite under section 112, paragraph 2. Ex parte Lyell, 17 USPQ2d 1548 (BPAI 1990). As the Board noted in Lyell, “the statutory class of invention is important in determining patentability and infringement.” Id. at 1550 (citing In re Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658, 665 (CCPA 1973); Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788, 796 (1870)). The Board correctly surmised that, as a result of the combination of two separate statutory classes of invention, a manufacturer or seller of the claimed apparatus would not know from the claim whether it might also be liable for contributory infringement because a buyer or user of the apparatus later performs the claimed method of using the apparatus. Id. Thus, such a claim “is not sufficiently precise to provide competitors with an accurate determination of the ‘metes and bounds’ of protection involved” and is “ambiguous and properly rejected” under section 112, paragraph 2. Id. at 1550-51. This rule is well recognized and has been incorporated into the PTO’s Manual of Patent Examination Procedure. § 2173.05(p)(II) (1999) (“A single claim which claims both an apparatus and the method steps of using the apparatus is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.”); see also Robert C. Faber, Landis on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting § 60A (2001) (“Never mix claim types to different classes of invention in a single claim.”).

 

Claim 25 recites both the system of claim 2 and a method for using that system. The claim reads:

 

The system of claim 2 [including an input means] wherein the predicted transaction information comprises both a transaction type and transaction parameters associated with that transaction type, and the user uses the input means to either change the predicted transaction information or accept the displayed transaction type and transaction parameters.

 

‘055 patent, col. 22, ll. 8-13 (emphasis added).

 

Thus, it is unclear whether infringement of claim 25 occurs when one creates a system that allows the user to change the predicted transaction information or accept the displayed transaction, or whether infringement occurs when the user actually uses the input means to change transaction information or uses the input means to accept a displayed transaction. Because claim 25 recites both a system and the method for using that system, it does not apprise a person of ordinary skill in the art of its scope, and it is invalid under section 112, paragraph 2.

A total of four claims have now been invalidated by the Federal Circuit under the hybrid claim principle.

Sovereign Immunity from Patent Infringement for Indian Tribes

February 21st, 2011

One of the interesting cases that might be appealed to the Federal Circuit soon is Specialty House of Creation, Inc. v. Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma, 10-CV-371-GKF-TLW (N. D. Okla. Jan. 27, 2011).  The case concerns whether an American Indian tribe can be sued for patent infringement if it has not consented to be sued.  The judge in the Quapaw case ruled in favor of the tribe and its assertion of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The district court cited an earlier district court case concerning patent infringement, Home Bingo Network v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 2005 WL 2098056 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005), and a second circuit copyright case  Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357-58 (2nd Cir. 2000)

Interestingly, the district  court cited  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) for the proposition that “[a]s a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”  Id.    The oral argument at the Supreme Court was argued by Federal Circuit nominee Edward DuMont.  You can listen to that oral argument here: [Listen][Read].

Sovereign immunity from patent infringement is an economically powerful asset.  As Indian nations seek to provide good jobs for their tribe members, it will be interesting to see if any attempt is made to rely on this asset and how it might be done. 

You can read the Quapaw decision here: [Read].

Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing for Jimmie V. Reyna

February 19th, 2011

The Senate Judiciary Committee conducted the confirmation hearing for Mr. Jimmie V. Reyna this past week. You can watch the video of the hearing below. Mr. Reyna is introduced at about the 30:30 minute mark along with other nominees. The questioning of Mr. Reyna begins at about the 52 minute mark.

Mr. Reyna is a specialist in international trade issues. Given this focus, he was asked specifically whether he would also be able to adjudicate whistle blower cases (the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over federal whistle blower cases and has heard 219 cases in its history ruling only 3 times in favor of the whistle blower according to Senator Grassley).

Mr. Reyna was not asked any questions about patent law during the hearing.

View Confirmation Hearing

Oral Argument of the Month

February 17th, 2011

The oral argument of the month for the month of February is Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Kappos, 2010-1321 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 11, 2011).  This case concerned a valuable patent that had gone abandoned due to failure to pay a maintenance fee. The docket clerk had apparently entered “abandoned” into the University’s docketing system. (From listening to the oral argument, I’m under the impression this might have occurred when the patent was surrendered as part of a reissue filing.) Once the error was discovered more than 2.5 years after expiration, the University was faced with an “unavoidable” standard in order to have the patent reinstated.

The Board apparently placed great weight on how much training and supervision the docket clerk received.  And, much of the oral argument concerned these issues.  For example, the docket clerk was apparently not supervised by a registered patent attorney but rather by an administrator (who was also an attorney).  I think the oral argument is worth a listen by any organization that has a docketing system — particularly those patent owners who choose to handle their docket themselves.  Such organizations might be well-advised to memorialize their training efforts and to periodically send docket clerks to training seminars.

This might also point to a business opportunity for those organizations that provide in-person or on-line patent seminars.  Seminars for docketing clerks could be in high-demand.

Unfortunately, the court only issued a Rule 36 opinion.  I think the patent bar would have appreciated a little more clarification from the court on these issues.

The oral argument is available here: [Listen].

The Rule 36 opinion is available here: [Read].

Video of Former Chief Judge Michel’s Testimony at House Subcommittee Hearing

February 14th, 2011

The Honorable Paul Michel, former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, testified before the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property last Friday. You can watch the video of the hearing below. Chief Judge Michel makes his opening statement at about the 34 minute mark of the video with subsequent questioning by the subcommittee members.

For easy reference, he addresses the following issues at the following time marks:

Hiring/Experienced Examiners 44:55
Post Grant 49:15
Post Grant/Reexamination 56:36
First to File 59:34
Fee Diversion/Fairness 1:06:32
Post Grant 1:11:33
Job Creation/Billion Dollar Bolus 1:17:20
Electronics/Software — Biotech Division 1:20:30
First to File 1:26:54
Outsourcing/Hiring 1:41:30
Third Party Submission of Prior Art 1:48:42
Reduction of Funding to 2008 Level/Codifying Legal Decisions 1:51:35

Former Chief Judge Paul Michel to Testify Before House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property

February 9th, 2011

The House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet will hold a hearing this Friday on  “Crossing the Finish Line on Patent Reform – What Can and Should be Done.”  I was pleased to see that the Honorable Paul Michel, former Chief Judge of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will be testifying.  David Simon, the Chief Patent Counsel for Intel, and Carl Horton, the Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for General Electric, will also be testifying. 

The committee hearing is scheduled for 10:30 AM Eastern time/8:30 AM Mountain time.  More information is available at this link: [LINK].

Chattler v. U.S.

February 7th, 2011

In a recent non-patent case at the Federal Circuit that concerned the interpretation of government agency regulations, Chattler v. U.S., 2010-1066 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2011),  Judge Dyk had some pointed words for the Department of Justice [Listen].  In the end, however, the majority including Judge Dyk ruled in favor of the United States.

You can read the opinion here: [Read].

You can listen to the entire oral argument here: [Listen].

Supreme Court Patent Case of the Week — Evans v. Jordan and Morehead

February 6th, 2011

13 U.S. 199 (1815)

9 Cranch 199

EVANS
v.
JORDAN AND MOREHEAD.

Supreme Court of United States.

March 2, 1815.

March 4, 1815.

Absent… . TODD, J.

200*200 HARPER, for the Plaintiff.

E.I. LEE, and P.B. KEY, contra.

 

201*201 WASHINGTON, J. delivered the opinion of the Court as follows:

 

202*202 The question certified to this Court, by the Circuit Court for the district of Virginia, and upon which the opinion of this Court is required, is, whether, after the expiration of the original patent granted to Oliver Evans, a general right to use his discovery was not so vested in the public as to require and justify such a construction of the act passed in January, 1808, entitled “an act for the relief of Oliver Evans” as to exempt from either treble or single damages, the use, subsequent to the passage of the said act, of the machinery therein mentioned, which was erected subsequent to the expiration of the original patent and previous to the passage of the said act.

 

The act, upon the construction of which the judges of the Circuit Court, were opposed in opinion, directs a patent to be granted, in the form prescribed by law, to Oliver Evans for 14 years, for the full and exclusive right of making, constructing, using, and vending to be used, his invention, discovery and improvements in the art of manufacturing flour and meal, and in the several machines which he has discovered, invented, improved, and applied to that purpose.

 

The proviso upon which the question arises is in the following words: “provided, that no person who may have heretofore paid the said Oliver Evans for license to use the said improvements, shall be obliged to renew said license, or be subject to damages for not renewing the same; and, provided also, that no person who shall have used the said improvements, or have erected the same for use, before the issuing of the said patent, shall be liable to damages therefor.”

 

The language of this last proviso is so precise, and so entirely free from all ambiguity, that it is difficult for any course of reasoning to shed light upon its meaning. It protects against any claim for damages which Evans might make, those who may have used his improvements, or who may have erected them for use, prior to the issuing of his patent under this law. The protection is limited to acts done prior to another act thereafter to be performed, to wit, the issuing of the patent. To extend it, by construction to acts which might be done subsequent to the issuing of the patent, would be to make, not to interpret the law.

 

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Track I Expedited Examination Rules Published Today

February 4th, 2011

The PTO’s proposed new rules for Track I Expedited Examination were published in the Federal Register today.  You can view them here: [Link].

Comments are due by March 7, 2011.

Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property

January 31st, 2011

Robert Shapiro, the former Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs, also testified before the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property last week.  His testimony was quite interesting.  It included some intriguing statistics such as: 

“Over the years 1995-2001, the development of new information technologies accounted for 28 percent of those productivity gains, capital investment in those technologies accounted for another 34 percent, research and development accounted for 10 percent, and changes in the organization of firms and worker training in response to these innovations accounted for another 10 percent. By applying this approach to data for more recent years, other researchers estimate that nearly 90 percent of U.S. economic growth from 2001 to 2003 can be attributed to increases in the stock of intangible assets.”

and

“Finally, research by the McKinsey Global Institute has documented the role of innovation in the value of large corporations. They found that in 1984, the book value of the 150 largest U.S. public companies – what their physical assets could be sold for on the open market – was equal to 75 percent of their market caps: Three-quarters of the value of large American companies was derived from its physical assets. By 2005, the book value of the 150 largest American companies was equal to just 36 percent of their market caps: Nearly two-thirds of their value is now based on their intangible assets, principally the value of the ideas protected by patent and copyrights.”

His written statement is available here: [Link].  If you agree with his conclusions, you might want to pass along some of these statistics to your local Congressperson or business journal editor.

David Kappos’ Testimony Before House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property

January 31st, 2011

Updated

David Kappos testified before the House Subcommitte on Intellectual Property last week in a hearing entitled “How an Improved U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Can Create Jobs.”  You can watch his testimony here.  The House had to stand in recess during the hearing in order to vote on the House floor.  So, the first video shows the first part of the hearing and the second video shows the second part.  Mr. Kappos’ written statement is available here: [Link].  

At about the 27 minute mark into the second video, Mr. Kappos comments that in a matter of days the PTO is going to publish new rules in the Federal Register for the PTO’s Track I examination program.  That program would guarantee a first office action within 3 months and a decision on patentability/grant within 12 months.  The fee would be $4,000 (with no small entity break, given the PTO’s current limitations on fee setting authority).

If you have difficulty viewing the clips below, you might try this link for the full video: [Link].

Video 1

Video 2

Claim Construction and the Microsoft Computer Dictionary

January 26th, 2011

computer-dictionary1Have you ever wondered if Microsoft’s computer dictionary has been used against it in patent litigation to construe patent claim terms?  Apparently, at the district court level in Uniloc v. Microsoft an argument was made by Uniloc that relied on Microsoft’s computer dictionary to construe claim language.  That argument was noted in the oral argument of the subsequent appeal to the Federal Circuit  [Listen].  The dictionary argument did not prevail at the district court level, however. [Link].

“Has the Temple of Justice been Defiled?”

January 19th, 2011

     One of the issues that came up in the oral argument of the recently decided case of iLOR v. Google, 2010-1117 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 11, 2011) was whether the district court was in error in awarding expert fees to Google.  To award such fees is beyond 35 U.S.C. §285 alone and requires invoking the inherent powers of the court.  However, the standard to be applied by the court to invoke such inherent powers is whether “fraud has been practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice has been defiled.”   So, during the oral argument, Chief Judge Rader inquired whether the temple of justice had been defiled: [Listen].

Supreme Court Patent Case of the Week

January 16th, 2011

The second patent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court was Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. 210 (1818):

16 U.S. 210 (1818)

3 Wheat. 210

EVANS
v.
EATON.

Supreme Court of United States.

223*223 February 6th. C.J. Ingersoll, for the plaintiff.

Hopkinson and Sergeant, contrà.

232*232 *503] *March 7th, 1818. MARSHALL, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

In this case, exceptions were taken in the circuit court, by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, 1st. To the opinion of the court, in admitting testimony offered by the defendant in that court. 2d. To its opinion in rejecting testimony offered by the plaintiff in that court. 3d. To the charge delivered by the judge to the jury.

Under the 6th section of the act for the promotion of useful arts, and to repeal the act heretofore made for that purpose, the defendant pleaded the general issue, and gave notice that he would prove at the trial, that the improved hopperboy, for the use of which, without license, this suit was instituted, had been used previous to the alleged invention of the said Evans, in several places (which were specified in the notice), or in some of them, “and also at sundry other places in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and elsewhere in the United States.” Having given evidence as to some of the places specified in the notice, the defendant offered evidence as to some other places 233*233 not specified. This evidence was objected to by the plaintiff, but admitted by the court; to which admission, the plaintiff’s counsel excepted.

The 6th section of the act appears to be drawn, on the idea, that the defendant would be not at liberty to contest the validity of the patent on the general issue. It, therefore, intends to relieve the defendant from the difficulties of pleading, when it allows him to give in *evidence matter [*504 which does affect the patent. But the notice is directed for the security of the plaintiff, and to protect him against that surprise to which he might be exposed, from an unfair use of this privilege. Reasoning merely on the words directing this notice, it might be difficult to define, with absolute precision, what it ought to be include, and what it might omit. There are, however, circumstances in the act which may have some influence on this point. It has been already observed, that the notice is substituted for a special plea; it is further to be observed, that it is a substitute to which the defendant is not obliged to resort. The notice is to be given only when it is intended to offer the special matter in evidence on the general issue. The defendant is not obliged to pursue this course, he may still plead specially, and then the plea is the only notice which the plaintiff can claim.[1] If, then, the defendant may give in evidence, on a special plea, the prior use of the machine, at places not specified in his plea, it would seem to follow, that he may give in evidence its use, at places not specified in his notice. It is not believed, that a plea would be defective, which did not state the mills in which the machinery alleged to be previously used was placed.

But there is still another view of this subject, which deserves to be considered. The section which directs this notice, also directs, that if the special matter stated in the section be proved, “judgment shall be rendered for the defendant, with costs, and the patent shall be declared void.” The notice might be intended, not only for the information of the plaintiff, *but for the purpose of spreading on the record the cause for which [*505 the patent was avoided. This object is accomplished by a notice which specifies the particular matter to be proved. The ordinary powers of the court are sufficient to prevent, and will, undoubtedly, be so exercised, as to prevent the patentee from being injured by the surprise.

This testimony having been admitted, the plaintiff offered to prove that the persons, of whose prior use of the improved hopperboy the defendant had given testimony, had paid the plaintiff for licenses to use his improved hopperboy in their mills, since his patent. This testimony was rejected by the court, on the motion of the defendant, and to this opinion of the court, also, the plaintiff excepted. The testimony offered by the plaintiff was entitled to very little weight, but ought not to have been absolutely rejected. Connected with other testimony, and under some circumstances, even the opinion of a party may be worth something. It is, therefore, in such a case as this, deemed more safe to permit it to go to the jury, subject, as all testimony is, to the animadversion of the court, than entirely to exclude it.

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“If … then” Claims

January 15th, 2011

If you are currently dealing with patents that recite “if …then” claim limitations, you might find the oral argument in Sutton v. Nokia, 2010-1218 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 15, 2010) to be of interest.  The Federal Circuit only issued a Rule 36 opinion in the case; so, for background, the district court opinion in Sutton v. Nokia, 647 F.Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Texas 2009) is available here [Link].

 The claim language discussed in the oral argument is shown below.  Most of the oral argument focuses on whether the claim can logically satisfy both steps (1) and (2) or whether the claim fails for impossibility: 

(1) if the received packet has a predetermined header and the receiver is configured to receive unmodified messages, then processing the packet as a modified packet according to steps (2) to (8), otherwise sending the packet to a user’s application as an unmodified paging message,

(2) if the receiver is configured to receive only data information messages processing the packet according to steps (3) to (8),

(3) treating the packet as 7 bit characters and reconstituting any characters indicated by a predetermined flag,

(4) packing the 7 bit characters into 8 bit characters,

(5) checking a frame byte for type of packet and compression,

(6) decompressing the packet to data,

(7) validating the subchannel and if valid releasing security passing the data to an end user application, and

(8) if the message is a control message parsing and processing the control message.

Arguing contingent claim limitations requires a flair for formal logic, such as this statement by the patent owner’s counsel [Listen]:

That’s denying the antecedent fallacy, where you read into the contingent step that if the contingent is false then the negative of the consequent must be true.  You’re basically saying if the receiver is not configured as in step 2 then don’t do step (3) to (8).  And, that’s the logical fallacy that we pointed out in our briefing . . . . 

Another case mentioned during the oral argument is Cybersettle v. National Arbitration Forum, 2007-1092 (Fed. Cir. July 24, 2007).  That opinion is availble here for reference: [Link].  That non-precedential case makes the following statement about “if . . . then” claims without citation of any precedent:

It is of course true that method steps may be contingent. If the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied, the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed.

Id. at page 7 of slip opinion.

 

 

You can listen to the entire oral argument in Sutton v. Nokia here: [Listen].

You can read the court’s opinion in Sutton v. Nokia here: [Read].